Voting and Quorum Procedures in the Senate

"At 10:00 P.M. on Election Evening, we were at 97% win with the so-called “bookies”." - Donald Trump, seeking the overturn the results of the Triple Crown

None The Pfizer

After the Trump administration nailed every other aspect of the pandemic response with flying colors, it may come as a shock to learn that its plan to distribute vaccines to hundreds of millions of Americans leaves something to be desired. Specifically, vaccines.

After Operation Warp Speed spent billions of dollars to hasten the development of coronavirus vaccines, 31 countries around the world have reserved more vaccine doses per capita than the U.S. It’s like ordering an elaborate cup of coffee and then walking out of Starbucks without it, except, you know, people will die. Incomprehensibly, this was a deliberate choice: Pfizer offered the Trump administration the chance to reserve more doses over the summer (“hey man, you forgot your coffee”), the Trump administration took a pass, and Pfizer now can’t guarantee another round of supplies until June.
FDA approval for the Pfizer vaccine—which will launch the deliveries of 6.4 million initial doses (enough to vaccinate 3.2 million people)—could come as soon as this week; in the meantime, Americans are stuck watching the U.K. and Canada sail towards national immunity like the D.W. meme. Authorization for the Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine, of which the U.S. has reserved 300 million doses, will be more delayed: AstraZeneca lost credibility with U.S. regulators when it failed to disclose a pause in clinical trials, and scientists have criticized the lack of transparency around its data. The vaccine is definitely safe and viable, but its efficacy rate is still unclear (especially among older adults), and that means we’ll have to wait.
When vaccines do get approved, it would be nice if states were ready to distribute them as quickly as possible, no? To paraphrase GOP leaders, “eh.” Congress has yet to appropriate any funds for vaccine distribution, which means cash-strapped local public health departments are left to both plan mass vaccination programs and somehow scrape together the money to hire enough staff to implement them. HHS has doled out around $340 million to the states for vaccine distribution; state officials say they need more like $8.4 billion, and needed it weeks ago.

Even in a delay-free world, the coronavirus task force warned on Tuesday, the vaccine program wouldn’t substantially reduce the spread of coronavirus until late spring.

No big deal to Donald Trump, who yesterday shared this psychopathic opinion on the percentage of Americans who have contracted coronavirus: “I hear we're close to 15 percent. I'm hearing that, and that's terrific.” A somewhat bigger deal for the third of Americans who live in areas where hospitals have run critically low on available ICU beds, and who don’t have access to the experimental Rich Old Man drugs that are apparently available almost exclusively to Donald Trump’s friends and keeping Rudy Giuliani tethered to his repulsive mortal coil.
In light of that, it would be nice if the government were to give people money to stay home and slow the spread, no? To paraphrase GOP leaders, “go fuck yourselves.” The U.S. is alone among wealthy Western countries in not providing material help to people during the winter surge, for the very simple reason that the party that currently runs our government is insane. In a sign that another stimulus package isn’t exactly imminent, the White House suggested adding a one-time $600 stimulus check to its discussion draft, but only in exchange for gutting enhanced unemployment benefits. Millions of Americans are at risk of eviction! Canada is paying jobless workers $2000 a month! There’s just no excuse!

It stands to reason that the Trump administration’s demonstrated indifference to saving American lives would hobble the vaccine effort, and we can fully expect Republicans to turn around on January 20 and try to blame the ensuing delays and deaths on Joe Biden. No one should give them the time of day. Hard as they might try to wipe it on to Biden’s hands, the blood is on theirs.

Look No Further Than The Crooked Media

We're only a few weeks away from the January 5 runoff in Georgia that will determine control of the Senate. Early voting starts on December 14, and if you're looking for ways to support groups on the ground making sure every voter makes their voice heard, sign up to Adopt Georgia. We'll be sending new opportunities to donate and volunteer every week between now and January, so head over to https://votesaveamerica.com/georgia to learn more about what you can do today.

Under The Radar

The Federal Trade Commission and 48 attorneys general have filed landmark antitrust lawsuits against Facebook, alleging that the company illegally crushed its competition by buying up its rivals and weaponizing its staggering troves of user data. Federal and state regulators have been investigating Facebook for over a year, and this marks the first government antitrust action against a company that’s been behaving like a monopoly for a decade.The lawsuits explicitly ask the DC district court to consider forcing Facebook to sell off Instagram and WhatsApp, a move that Mark Zuckerberg has said would be “existential” for the company. Oh nooo, where would we all go to spread antisemitic conspiracy theories, spur on the downfall of American democracy, and wish an aunt we've never met happy birthday?

What Else?

The president is just straight up tweeting “#OVERTURN” now. That hashtag is gonna turn this whole coup around.
Trump and 17 states have joined Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s lawsuit asking the Supreme Court to help Republicans overturn (#overturn?) election results in Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
The Senate confirmed three nominees to the Federal Election Commission, after the agency sat around uselessly for months without a quorum.
The EPA has finalized a rule making it more difficult to enact public health protections, one of several rules the Trump administration is fast-tracking to environmentally screw over Joe Biden.
Gov. Tom Wolf (D-PA) is in quarantine after testing positive for coronavirus but said he hasn't experienced any symptoms.
An Idaho health official left a virtual meeting in tears because anti-mask protesters had surrounded her home, where her 12-year-old son was alone.
Relatedly, here’s the completely heartbreaking story of Mitchell, SD, one of many red state towns where residents followed GOP leaders in not taking coronavirus precautions seriously until people started dying—and where a group of anti-maskers continued to vehemently oppose a local mask mandate.
YouTube will start taking down new videos that spread voter fraud conspiracy theories, right in the nick of time.
Cartoon voter-fraud witness Melissa Carone said she isn’t self-quarantining and hasn’t gotten tested after testifying next to COVID-positive fart-machine Rudy Giuliani.
Joe Biden might send Pete Buttigieg to China as an ambassador, in the latest indication that he is a mere puppet for radical socialist Amy Klobuchar.
Piers Morgan has been forced to deny a rumor that he played the Central Park Pigeon Lady in Home Alone 2, but enough people believe the rumor that we should probably let all of the legal challenges play out.

Be Smarter

A new study found that rural, predominantly Black counties have the highest IRS audit rates. You know, where all the rich white tax evaders live. Humphreys County, MS, where more than a third of mostly Black residents are below the poverty line, is the most heavily-audited county in the country—because so many taxpayers are poor. The IRS doggedly audits taxpayers who claim the earned income tax credit, a program meant to lift workers out of poverty, under pressure from congressional Republicans. As a result, the five counties with the highest audit rates are all poor, majority Black counties in the deep south, and the audit rate is next-highest in majority-Hispanic counties and those with Native American reservations. Try to claim a legal tax credit and get slammed with a year-long IRS audit, while wealthier white populations enjoy an unaudited existence: What could be fairer?

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Is That Hope I Feel?

New York has pledged to divest its $226 billion pension fund from fossil fuels by 2050, and completely decarbonize the fund by 2040.
A universal flu vaccine that protects against all strains of the flu and lasts for years may not be far off.
The House has passed a bill that would broaden marijuana research in states where the drug is already legal.
Taylor Swift donated $13,000 to two mothers on the verge of eviction. Your turn, federal government.

Enjoy

place where cats shouldn't be on Twitter: "* 1 video attached *"

CITY OF CLEMSON ORDINANCE CC-2020-
A TEMPORARY EMERGENCY ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF CLEMSON, SOUTH CAROLINA, TO REQUIRE THE WEARING OF FACE COVERINGS IN PUBLIC PLACES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF TRANSMISSION OF THE COVID-19 VIRUS.
WHEREAS, the COVID-19 virus has continued to sharply and aggressively spread in our State - in the past 10 days, there have been 8577 new positive test results; and,
WHEREAS, testing of the City’s wastewater indicates elevated levels of virus in the community similar to levels in other cities in which an outbreak of the virus was about to occur or was well underway; and,
WHEREAS, certain local businesses have had to close down as the result of infections suffered by employees; and,
WHEREAS, there currently is no vaccine for COVID-19, and public health physicians and authorities have uniformly indicated that the only current way to slow infection rates is to limit exposure; and,
WHEREAS, taking measures to try to reduce infection rates is intended to minimize risk to the public health, reduce pressure on healthcare providers and pharmaceutical supplies, lower the rates of illness and absenteeism for providers of public and essential goods and services, and increase the number of available beds for intensive medical treatment for all types of illnesses and injuries; and,
WHEREAS, public health physicians and authorities, including, but not limited to, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/preventgetting-sick/prevention.html and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) https://www.scdhec.gov/infectious-diseases/viruses/coronavirus-disease-2019- covid-19/protect-yourself-those-around-you-covid-19 , recommend the wearing of face coverings in public places; and,
WHEREAS, South Carolina Code §5-7-250 empowers Council to enact certain temporary emergency ordinances affecting life, health, and safety; and,
WHEREAS, in order to protect, preserve, and promote, the health, safety, welfare, peace, and order for the citizens and visitors to the City of Clemson community, Council deems it necessary and proper to adopt this temporary emergency ordinance; and,
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the Mayor and City Council of the City of Clemson, in Council duly assembled and with a quorum present, that:

Wearing of Face Coverings. In order to reduce the rate of COVID-19 transmission in public places in the City of Clemson, every person is required to wear a face covering in accordance with this ordinance. We further recommend using CDC guidelines. For the protection of employees and other customers, and subject to the requirements of the ORDINANCE NO. CC-2020- 2 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, (ADA), businesses must require their employees to wear face coverings while at work. For example, face coverings or masks are required:

a. Inside any building open to the public, such as, but not limited to, grocery stores, pharmacies, business locations, home improvement stores, retail stores, service establishments, and medical and dental treatment facilities;
b. Inside all City of Clemson buildings;
c. On all transport and transit vehicles, including, but not limited to, CATbus, Senior Solutions, rideshare (such as Uber or Lyft), taxi, and shuttle vehicles;
d. While waiting to enter any building open to the public, any City of Clemson building, or waiting to board any transport or transit vehicle, unless a distance of at least six feet is consistently maintained from any person who is not that person’s family or household member;
e. When coming into contact with any person who is not that person’s family or household member, whether indoors or outdoors, including, but not limited to, contact during gatherings, curbside pickup, drive-thru and food truck purchases, deliveries, and service calls; and,
f. While working in all jobs that entail coming into contact with any member of the public, including, but not limited to, all jobs involving the preparation or packaging of food and/or beverage unless separated by a physical barrier between the employee and the public.

Parents and guardians are responsible for the safety of their minor children, and are urged to follow CDC guidelines regarding face coverings with respect to children younger than 12. Minor children 12 years and older are expected to wear face coverings in accordance with this ordinance, unless exempt as set forth herein.

Definitions.

a. “Business” includes all commercial, retail, wholesale, professional, and service establishments, whether for profit or not for profit, if members of the public, guests, clients, customers, and/or persons who are not family or household members may enter or otherwise come into contact with owners, operators, or employees.
b. “Face covering” means a clean cloth, fabric, or other soft or permeable material, without holes, that covers both the mouth and nose, including, but not limited to surgical masks, respirators, face shields, handmade or homemade masks, bandanas, neck gaiters, scarves, or wraps made up of tightly woven fabric such as denim or cotton.
c. “Household” means all persons living in the same dwelling unit. It does not include the residents of separate dwelling units at the same location, such as may be the case at a dormitory, apartment complex, or other multi-unit residence.
d. “In contact” means coming within 6 feet.
e. “Person or persons” includes all persons not exempted from wearing face coverings or masks in this ordinance. The term includes business employees, as well as customers, visitors, guests, clients, and invitees. ORDINANCE NO. CC-2020- 3
f. “Public places” includes publicly owned property, but also includes business properties to which members of the public and/or customers, clients, or guests are allowed or invited.
g. CDC guidelines https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-gettingsick/how-to-wear-cloth-face-coverings.html currently set forth that face coverings: - Cover the mouth AND nose; and, - Fit snugly against the sides of the face, - Be secure under the chin; and, - Not be removed, or lowered to the neck or the forehead.

Location exemptions. The wearing of face coverings may be advisable, but is not required:

a. In personal vehicles and private homes;
b. In privately owned business locations, at times when members of the public, clients, customers, guests, or other invitees are not present, or as long as there is a distance of at least six feet is maintained from persons who are not family or household members;
c. While participating in recreational physical activities, whether outdoor or indoor, as long as a distance of at least six feet is consistently maintained from persons who are not family or household members;
d. While eating, drinking, or smoking (in locations where smoking is permitted), as long as a distance of at least six feet is maintained from other customers and guests; and,
e. While with family members and/or members of the same household.

Persons not required to wear face covering:

a. Persons with a medical condition, mental health condition, or disability that prevents wearing a face covering;
b. Persons whose religious beliefs prevent them from wearing a face covering;
c. Persons who are hearing impaired, or who are communicating with a person who is hearing impaired, where the ability to see the mouth is essential for communication;
d. Persons for whom wearing a face covering would create a risk to the person related to their work, as determined by local, state, or federal regulators or workplace safety guidelines;
e. Persons who are obtaining a service or treatment involving the nose or face or a medical procedure for which temporary removal of the face covering is necessary to perform the service;
f. Persons who are seated at a restaurant or other establishment that offers food or beverage service. There must be six feet between groups and each group can contain no more than 6 unrelated people.
g. Persons complying with instructions from law enforcement or other first responders. ORDINANCE NO. CC-2020- 4 As they are able, persons exempted from wearing face coverings are encouraged to socially distance. If unable to social distance, such persons are encouraged to use safe alternative means of protection.

5.Enforcement. Law enforcement and other public safety and emergency management personnel are encouraged and expected to educate and encourage voluntary compliance with this order. However, any person found to have violated any mandatory provision of this ordinance shall be found guilty of a civil infraction, punishable by a fine of not more than $25. Any business found not requiring their employees to comply with this ordinance shall be found guilty of a civil infraction, punishable by a fine of not more than $100. Each day of a continuing violation of this ordinance shall be considered a separate and distinct offense.
In addition to these enforcement measures, repeated violations by a person or business are hereby declared to be a public nuisance, which may be abated by the City via restraining order, injunction, or other equitable or legal means.

Severability. If any subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word of this ordinance or any application of it to any person, structure, or circumstance is held to be invalid or unconstitutional by a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, then such holding shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions or applications of this ordinance.
Effective date. This emergency ordinance shall take effect Thursday, June 25, 2020, and shall remain in effect until terminated by the issuance of another ordinance expressly stating that it is terminated or extended, or it shall automatically expire on the 61st day after enactment of this ordinance, whichever date is earlier.

2020_07_06EmergencyOrdinanceFaceCoverings

In this instalment of the current series on authoring a federal European constitution, I am going to deal with the controversial question how far a written constitution should bind the sovereign, and whether the state as an instrument of the sovereign should be indefinitely bound at all. I contrast parliamentary sovereignty with popular sovereignty. Ideally, this part should be read in conjunction with the following part that will deal with questions of judicial review that are inextricably linked to questions of sovereignty.
Parts to this series
Pt 0: Subsidiarity, decentralisation, and the importance of municipal autonomy
Pt 1: Revisions regarding the government of a federal EU
Pt 2: Of the administrative and the electoral branches
Pt 3: Thoughts concerning parliamentary supremacy/sovereignty
Pt 4: Judicial pre-view rather than re-view?
Pt 5: State of emergency: ideas regarding emergency powers
Pt 6: The presidential veto‘s significance
This article contrasts our current understanding of democracy with how democracy was more classically understood, and whether there are areas where the demos should proceed to reclaim its power from putative “elites”. As I became a member of DiEM25 only a short while ago, this question has sparked some interest with me because, while DiEM25 is a federalist movement, there is some talk going on about including in the eventual constitution a “sovereign parliament”. As we shall see, federalism and parliamentary sovereignty are contradictory.
Natural law against positive law
The controversy of natural law against positive law has been going on since the Enlightenment. Understanding this controversy is central to understanding why “rigid constitutionalism” (the presence of entrenched constitutional law) has become more widespread within Europe rather than its opposite, parliamentary sovereignty.
Proponents of natural law posit that law comes from sources higher than humans because law is (or ought to be) based on morals and morals come from higher sources. Such higher sources of law may be deities, holy scripture, other kinds of revelation, or “values”, among others. The problem with natural law is that what is considered natural law is contingent upon what the observer considers “natural”. In other words, the conflict over natural law circles around the question how “natural” it really is.
Positive law, on the other hand, is law that is made by humans:

In its strictest sense, positive law is law that is made by humans. Specifically, Black’s Law Dictionary defines positive law as “Law actually and specifically enacted or adopted by proper authority for the government of an organized jural society.” In a more complex sense, the term positive law refers to a legal philosophy of positivism.

Positive law proponents have a different view of the relation between morality and law. I am partial towards Austrian lawyer Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law. Next to having been the Austrian constitution’s principal author, he is regarded as the 20th century’s most prominent exponent of legal positivism. In his pure theory of law, Kelsen attempts to strip law of all metaphysical baggage:

The main challenge for a theory of law, as Kelsen saw it, is to provide an explanation of legality and the normativity of law, without an attempt to reduce jurisprudence, or “legal science”, to other domains. The law, Kelsen maintained, is basically a scheme of interpretation. Its reality, or objectivity, resides in the sphere of meaning; we attach a legal-normative meaning to certain actions and events in the world (PT1, 10). …
… But then, of course, the question is why certain acts or events have such a legal meaning and others don’t? Kelsen’s answer to this question is surprisingly simple: an act or an event gains its legal-normative meaning by another legal norm that confers this normative meaning on it. An act can create or modify the law if it is created in accordance with another, “higher” legal norm that authorizes its creation in that way. And the “higher” legal norm, in turn, is legally valid if and only if it has been created in accord with yet another, “higher” norm that authorizes its enactment in that way. The problem that obviously arises here is the “infinite regress”. That is, the chain of presupposed higher laws goes on without end. While this is often considered a problem mainly for positive law, I do not see how this is much different from proponents of natural law positing that there is some sort of higher source of law. In either case, the existence of such a higher source can only be assumed. Kelsen approached this issue pragmatically by presupposing the existence of a “basic norm”:
At this point, Kelsen famously argued, one must presuppose the legal validity of the Constitution. At some stage, in every legal system, we get to an authorizing norm that has not been authorized by any other legal norm, and thus it has to be presupposed to be legally valid. The normative content of this presupposition is what Kelsen has called the basic norm. The basic norm is the content of the presupposition of the legal validity of the (first, historical) constitution of the relevant legal system (GT, 110–111).
As Kelsen saw it, there is simply no alternative. More precisely, any alternative would violate David Hume’s injunction against deriving an “ought” from an “is”. Hume famously argued that any practical argument that concludes with some prescriptive statement, a statement of the kind that one ought to do this or that, would have to contain at least one prescriptive statement in its premises. If all the premises of an argument are descriptive, telling us what this or that is the case, then there is no prescriptive conclusion that can logically follow. Kelsen took this argument very seriously. He observed that the actions and events that constitute, say, the enactment of a law, are all within the sphere of what “is” the case, they are all within the sphere of actions and events that take place in the world. The law, or legal norms, are within the sphere of “ought”, they are norms that purport to guide conduct. Thus, to get an “ought” type of conclusion from a set of “is” premises, one must point to some “ought” premise in the background, an “ought” that confers the normative meaning on the relevant type of “is”. Since the actual, legal, chain of validity comes to an end, we inevitably reach a point where the “ought” has to be presupposed, and this is the presupposition of the basic norm.

To my mind, Kelsen’s has found a more elegant solution to the problem of the origin of law than natural law proponents, at least as long as we primarily consider their pragmatism. Proponents of rigid constitutionalism frequently have a higher view of natural law than of positive law, at least to the extent that they assume that basic human rights ought to be afforded special protection by the constitution, lest they cannot be abolished by majority decision. This begs the question where such basic human rights originate from if they are deemed so paramount that they may not be abolished? If we entertain Kelsen’s idea of the basic norm, it is, to my mind, a moot point that the basic norm cannot be there without any meaning other than a legal fiction. The basic norm needs to be “filled” with values over which the demos has come to an understanding about what is worthy of protection. This is practically similar to natural law but not theoretically as the laws may only partially originate from higher sources. During deliberation, values derived from higher sources may be incorporated into law together with values derived from secular sources. The separation of law (the ‘is’) and morality (the ‘ought’) is maintained, albeit the line between the two becomes somewhat fuzzy.
As Austrian lawyer Peter Pernthaler lays out:

Nicht in diesen Formeln, sondern in der damit vorausgesetzten Begrenzung der Volkssouveränität durch Menschenrechte, Verantwortlichkeit der Staatsgewalt und andere überpositive Rechtsgrundsätze, die auch die demokratische Verfassungsgebung beschränken, liegt die Bedeutung des Transzendenzbezugs der modernen Staatsverfassung: Nach den Erfahrungen plebiszitär verbrämter totalitärer Staatsgewalt in Diktaturen und autoritären Regimen ist die Grundvorstellung des Verfassungsstaates, dass auch die verfassungsgebende Gewalt des Volkes keine schrankenlose Gewalt des Staats über Menschen begründet, ein besonders wichtiges Element der Freiheitlichkeit dieser Ordnung.
It is not in these formulas, but in the limitation of popular sovereignty by human rights, responsibility of the state authority and other over-positive legal principles, which also limit democratic constitutionalism, that the significance of the transcendence reference of the modern state constitution lies: After the experience of totalitarian state power dressed up in plebiscitary fashion in dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, the basic idea of the constitutional state, that the constitutional power of the people does not establish an unlimited power of the state over people, is a particularly important element of the freedom of this order.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
In contrast, Hans Kelsen:

Die Frage, die auf das Naturrecht zielt, ist die ewige Frage, was hinter dem positiven Recht steckt. Und wer die Antwort sucht, der findet, fürchte ich, nicht die absolute Wahrheit einer Metaphysik noch die absolute Gerechtigkeit eines Naturrechts. Wer den Schleier hebt und sein Auge nicht schliesst, dem starrt das Gorgonenhaupt der Macht entgegen.
The question that aims at natural law is the eternal question of what is behind positive law. And he who seeks the answer will find, I fear, neither the absolute truth of a metaphysics nor the absolute justice of a natural law. He who lifts the veil and does not close his eye, the Gorgon head of power stares at him.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
At the end of the day, we must ask ourselves: what do we value more – the power of the demos to make or unmake any law (strict legal positivism), or the supremacy of god-given rights by which all other law is bound (strict natural law)? Two of the most well-known federal constitutions in the world – the US Constitution and the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany – both take strict natural law approaches. They extensively protect basic rights and this protection is upheld through judicial review by powerful supreme courts.
What is parliamentary sovereignty?
As A. V. Dicey put it for the United Kingdom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliamentary_sovereignty#History) – a country without a definitively codified constitution – in 1885,

Parliament means, in the mouth of a lawyer (though the word has often a different sense in conversation) the King, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons: these three bodies acting together may be aptly described as the "King in Parliament", and constitute Parliament. The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely that Parliament thus defined has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever: and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.

This means that Parliament can make and unmake any law it wants. It cannot, by definition, bind itself indefinitely to a law higher than itself. In other words, it cannot entrench laws. R. Elliot, in his essay Rethinking Manner and Form: From ParliamentarySovereignty to Constitutional Values published at York University in Canada, points out how this presents a contradiction, funnily rendering Parliament un-sovereign, with a quote by Professor Hamish Gray (PDF page 3):

[I]f Parliament is sovereign, there is nothing it cannot do by legislation; if there is nothing Parliament cannot do by legislation, it may bind itself hard and fast by legislation; if Parliament so binds itself by legislation there are things it cannot do by legislation; and if there are such things Parliament is not sovereign.

This is a problem that applies not just to parliamentary sovereignty but to sovereignty in general and cannot be reasonably solved. I, on the other hand, think that there could be a way in which not a solution but at the very least a reasonable reconciliation might be found. However, that way is not found within British constitutionalism but within continental European constitutionalism. More specifically, we have to differentiate between British-style parliamentary sovereignty and continental-style popular sovereignty.
Parliamentary sovereignty and codified constitutions
There are currently six countries in the northern part of Europe where the principle of parliamentary sovereignty still applies, despite all of these countries having codified constitutions as opposed to the UK with its non-codified one. These countries are the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. This is in contrast to continental Europe, in general, where it is not parliamentary sovereignty that applies but popular sovereignty.
The Dutch constitution – published in 1815, it is the oldest constitution still in existence within the EU – explicitly forbids the courts from practising judicial review. In the other mentioned countries, the courts overturning laws is likewise seen as a no-go and there have been instances where courts declaring laws to be in contravention of higher law caused some resentment.
Within the environment of a codified constitution, parliamentary sovereignty means that the constitution establishes the organs of state but that it is, really, positive law-making that does all the rest. Parts of the constitution that concern themselves with things that are meant to protect the citizenry against state overreach – such as basic rights – under parliamentary sovereignty, necessarily have to be understood as mere statements of intent to which the legislature binds itself voluntarily. One such case was Germany’s constitution from 1919 to 1933 that included a section on basic rights that were mere statements of intent. The Weimar Constitution also included a part concerned with amending it but it was accepted practice that requirements named therein could be circumvented by passing an ordinary law by a constitutional majority of two thirds. A law passed in this manner was not literally considered to be in breach of the constitution but merely adding to it, despite the original provision remaining in place. According to the principle “lex posterior derogat legi priori” (new law derogates old law), the new added quasi-constitutional law overwrote the constitution itself. A similar approach is practised to this day in Austria, where Hans Kelsen’s constitution allows parliament to pass laws in breach of it as long as such laws are designated constitutional by the legislature with two thirds supermajority (with the exception of the basic constitutional principles that require referenda to be amended)#Entrenchment). This is a very radical application of both positivism and majoritarianism, to the point that not even basic rights are protected if there is a majority to override them. In both countries, this led to the establishment of dictatorships: the Nazi regime in Germany and the Austro-fascist regime in Austria were well-aware that the veneer of legality was of great use to legitimising their rule.
Parliamentary sovereignty and federalism
There is currently no country known to me that features both parliamentary sovereignty and federalism. This should not be surprising, for federalism relies on a rigid constitution to delineate the competencies within the remit of the constituent states and those competencies within the remit of the federation. Albeit there are two well-known federations that developed under the supremacy of the British Parliament – Australia and Canada – commencing with the patriation of either country’s constitution in the 1980s and the removal of the last vestiges of British colonial rule, parliamentary decision-making has definitively come under the courts’ review there.
In federations where (federal) parliament is de facto supreme (Austria and Weimar Germany), this led to lasting undermining of, mostly legislative, competencies by the federation. Austria today is in practice more a unitary state than a federation, and Weimar Germany was on a similar trajectory. Indeed, unitarisation was equated with democratisation during the Weimar Republic era because federalism was inextricably associated with the authoritarian, monarchical predecessor state that was the German Empire. In the Imperial German Constitution, federalism was instituted as a means to satisfy traditional ruling elites – the state monarchies and their bureaucracies – while at the same time uniting the country under a common ruler, a behemoth by the name of Prussia. Hence, the executive was mostly left to the states whereas the legislative branch was transferred to the federation. The continuing existence of Prussia was viewed as unsatisfying by the authors of the Weimar Constitution, due to its enormous size covering more than two thirds of Germany that inevitably put it in a competing position to the federal government. In Austria, federalism was likewise a means of ensuring the continued influence of traditional ruling elites. Under the Habsburgs, German-speaking Austria was divided into “crownlands” with devolved competencies. The conservatives and reactionaries wanted to massively extend their powers and make them autonomous within Austria, whereas the progressive social democrats sought to unitarise Austria. As a compromise, the crownlands were reconstituted as states of a federal republic but without increased competencies. The few residual competencies left with the states were further eroded in the second half of the 20th century by use of federal parliament’s effective supremacy.
What I want to illustrate with the above paragraph is that intent matters. If it is our intent to preserve far-reaching state level political, financial, and cultural autonomy for the foreseeable future in the Union, we need to institute a system that precludes sweeping transfers of competencies from the state to the Union level. I remain convinced that we will not achieve this while adhering to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, not least because in federations sovereignty is supposed to be shared between the levels of government.
Kompetenz-Kompetenz
“Kompetenz-Kompetenz” is a term originating within German constitutionalism. Constitutional lawyers in Germany use this term to point out which level within a system of multilevel governance has the competency to decide over the delineation of competencies. It has since found its way into EU terminology, although in the EU the states remain “Masters of the Treaties”. In Germany and Austria, “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” rests with the respective federation.
What is important to keep in mind here is that awarding the federal level with Kompetenz-Kompetenz may be a recipe for the kind of sweeping unitarisation and centralisation that I warn against in the paragraph above. It is also unclear why, in a system that is constructed towards separating state and federal level political parties from each other, the party system at the centre of the federation should decide over which level may do this or that. At the very least, both state and federal level should be involved in enumerating each other’s powers. In Germany, the state level may be legally involved through a required two-thirds majority in the upper house, the Federal Council, but the Council is firmly in the hands of a centralised party system. This comes in addition to the fact that, thanks to being in the hands of the party system, it is the executive that initiates constitutional amendment procedures and not the people.
When we look at federations such as Australia, Canada, Switzerland, or the United States, it becomes clear that in these countries amendments to the constitutions need the approval not only of the federal level but also of the state level. In Australia, amendments need to pass both the Commonwealth Parliament and a referendum with a majority of all voters overall and in each state separately. In Canada, amendments to certain entrenched provisions need the approval of the federal parliament and a supermajority of provincial legislatures. In Switzerland, not only the Federal Assembly needs to approve constitutional amendments but so does a majority of validly cast votes across the country and in a majority of cantons. In the United States, constitutional amendments need to be approved both by Congress and by three quarters of state legislatures; alternatively a Convention can be summoned. But, as in Germany and in Austria, with the exception of Switzerland, in these countries constitutional amendments are initiated by politicians, not the people as a whole.
It is clear that a European federal constitution needs to provide for the inclusion of both the people as a whole and the states in constitutional amendments.
The Swiss example, to my mind, is of great importance here. The Swiss Federal Court does not possess powers of judicial review as far as federal legislation is concerned. As such, the Federal Assembly was de facto sovereign until the introduction of the popular initiative. A popular initiative meant to allow the demos to directly introduce proposals of law to the Assembly in Switzerland may only concern itself with amending the constitution. Another direct democratic instrument at the disposal of the Swiss is the optional referendum by which voters may vote to stop a law passed by the Assembly before it comes into force. These two instruments allow Switzerland to have both effective popular sovereignty and a rigid (within limits) constitution. Parliamentary sovereignty transformed into popular sovereignty, so to say. I shall explain how this arrangement could be transported into a European federal context in the next paragraph.
Entrenchment and the constitutional meaning of eternity clauses
One very popular way in which constitutions have been entrenched since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 has been the inclusion of so-called “eternity clauses” in the document. An eternity clause is a provision that bars the legislature – the pouvoir constitué – from amending certain sections of the constitution. The most prominent example of the inclusion of eternity clauses is the German Basic Law. Article 79 of the Basic Law protects, among others, the existence of the federation, its subdivision into states, the welfare state, democracy, rule of law, the separation of powers, and the basic rights – among which are human dignity and the abolishment of the death penalty. I remain very much in favour of keeping it that way in Germany, for we have done very well thanks to it. However, I do understand that Europe is not Germany and that what is considered politically acceptable here is not necessarily politically acceptable in Denmark, for example, where constitutionally baring parliament from making certain decisions is frowned upon as undemocratic.
Before I continue, I need to introduce further terminology. Specifically, this paragraph is going to deal with the distinction between the pouvoir constituant and the pouvoir constitué. These two terms designate the position of popular sovereignty before and after a constitution is put in place. The pouvoir constituant denotes the constitution-“giving” power, and may be split up into the pouvoir constituant originaire (that originally put the constitution in place) and the pouvoir constituant derivé (that revises the constitution in whole or in part). On the other hand, the pouvoir constitué means the power of the established state, deriving its powers from the aforementioned pouvoir constituant, as it exists within its institutions. I prefer to call the former “demos”, so as to make clear that the latter is built upon the former. The demos is where all sovereignty emanates from.
Up to now, I only spoke of parliamentary sovereignty in exactly these two terms - “parliament” and “sovereignty”. However, the sovereignty of parliament is sometimes referred to as parliamentary supremacy. I think at this point it makes sense to go one step further and separate the two into (popular) sovereignty, as described above, on the one hand, and explicit supremacy on the other.
In this sense, sovereignty rests exclusively with the demos. It is the demos and only the demos that may author constitutions; it, by definition, cannot bind itself indefinitely, however contradictory this may in fact be. It is the master of all laws within the borders of the state and has the last word over all decisions. According to Martin Heckel:

Die verfassunggebende Gewalt ist aus Normen nicht ableitbar, aber enthält eine Normenentscheidung, die Normen schafft. Sie ist die Frucht eines historischen Augenblicks, die doch Konstanz über den Augenblick hinaus beansprucht. […] Sie verlangt Unverbrüchlichkeit, obwohl sie aus dem Bruch des bisher geltenden Verfassungsrechts entstammt und auch die geltende Verfassungsordnung im Umbruch hinwegfegen kann. Sie äußert sich in der – oft gewalttätig eruptiven – Revolution des Volkes, das aber dann kraft seiner Verfassungsgebenden Gewalt die verfassten Organe des Staates auf die strikte Durchsetzung der Verfassung gegen jeglichen Revolutionsversuch, Staatsstreich und Verfassungsbruch verpflichtet – solange es [das Volk] die Verfassung trägt.
The constituent power cannot be derived from norms, but contains a normative decision that creates norms. It is the fruit of a historical moment, which nevertheless claims constancy beyond the moment. ...] It demands unbreakability, even though it stems from the breach of the previously valid constitutional law and can also sweep away the current constitutional order in upheaval. It expresses itself in the - often violently eruptive - revolution of the people, who then, however, by virtue of their constitutional power, oblige the constitutional organs of the state to strictly enforce the constitution against any attempt at revolution, coup d'état and breach of the constitution - as long as they [the people] bear the constitution.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Within the Union’s constitutional order, however, it is Parliament that is supreme; that is to say, Parliament is at the centre of the entire political system and all competencies not assigned to other bodies (the Senate, the executive, the judiciary, the states etc.) rest with Parliament. The constitution distributes competencies among the federal, state, and local levels in such a fashion that it includes for Necessary and Proper clauses that the courts have to interpret in a way that allocate to each level not just the enumerated powers but also those powers that are necessary and proper to exercise the enumerated powers.
Eternity clauses should be avoided. Including them may only lead to resentment in those states that do not have a political culture that values such clauses over the supremacy of parliament. Instead, procedures should be included that enable the demos to be directly involved in resolving central constitutional matters. We ought to embrace a “weak constitutionalism” as Joel Colón-Ríos puts it in his book “Weak Constitutionalism: Democratic Legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power“
Central matters can include basic rights, the federal distribution of powers, or certain state principles such as the rule of law In my recent reply to u/NombreGracioso, who is at unease with eternity clauses, I sketched out an amendment procedure:

1) Plebiscite - a non-binding, consultative popular vote for the public to test the waters about rewriting the constitution. The quorum is at 50 percent of validly cast ballots.
1.1) Alternatively to 1), a popular initiative may circumvent the plebiscite if a minimum number of signatures signifies sufficient interest in amending the constitution.
2) Initial referendum - after the consultation, if the public turned out to be in favour, a referendum is held to determine whether the assembly should be elected. The quorum: at least 50 percent of validly cast ballots in two thirds of the states.
3) Assembly elections - according to a special electoral law, the constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution is elected.
4) Consultative popular votes - the assembly puts the amendments to a popular vote in order to determine their popularity and, by extension, the likelihood of the proposed constitution going through in step 5. In order to be deemed representative, the quorum is the same as in step 2.
5) Final referendum - the revised constitution is adopted by another referendum. The required quorum is increased to 50 percent of validly cast ballots in three quarters of the states.
As you can see, the quorum gradually increases to the point that, at the end, the people of all states have to be in favour. This is a greater hurdle than the normal constitutional amendments procedure I laid out in my previous reply. The danger of an emotionalised voting public is reduced by the long, multi-step process. If people don't even give a damn, usurpation by a small but loud minority is prevented by the quorum at step 1 already.
An alternative process of amending entrenched provisions could be done by corresponding votes of the legislature in joint sessions, so 1) you have a plebiscite, 2) a first two-thirds majority vote by the joint legislative bodies, 3) special elections, 4) consultative popular votes concerning the detailed amendments, and 5) a confirming two-thirds majority vote by the joint legislative bodies. Special elections also take place in Switzerland after a resolution in favour of the total revision of the federal constitution has been adopted.

The demos should at any time have the opportunity to call for a constituent assembly in order to review the constitution and the laws. There ought to be a way for the demos to be able to include its ever-changing preferences and ideas in the it without being subject to the same limitations as Parliament. At no point in time may any of the pouvoirs constituées bind the constituent assembly to any law or set up any requirements that it must meet, for it is the demos in the constituent assembly that possesses ultimate power to make or unmake the constitution.
This approach should ensure democratic legitimacy while at the same time protecting the constitution from being modified by elected officials with the intention of gutting it.
Building on this article, the next article will show ways of dealing with the problems that come with judicial review.

Strengthening Congressional Disclosures and Trading Regulations Act

Whereas one of the worst acts a public official can take is attempting to profit from the information provided to them through their duties as a public servant,
Whereas insider trading works against the goals of an efficient market,
Whereas more disclosures regarding congressional trading will make potential wrong-doing easier to spot,
Whereas public officials must be fully accountable to the people they represent,
Be it Enacted by the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION I. TITLE
a) This act shall be referred to as the “Strengthening Congressional Disclosures and Trading Regulations Act.”
SECTION II. FINDINGS
a) Congress finds that there are not adequate measures in place to prevent Congressmen and public officials engaging in trading with non-public knowledge.
b) Congress finds the STOCK Act attempted to make public officials more accountable, but did not go far enough.
c) Congress finds that there are other business transactions outside of stock trades that could be made based on non-public knowledge.
SECTION III. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
a) This bill is enacted pursuant to the power granted to Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.
SECTION IV. DEFINITIONS
a) “Official in public trust” shall be defined as any member or delegate to the United States Congress and their spouse, any member of Congressional staff, any officer or employee of the Legislative branch, any Executive branch employee as defined in under Section 2105 of Title 5, and any judicial employee or judicial officer as defined under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.
b) An “eligible exchange traded fund” (hereafter referred to as an “ETF”) shall be defined as any exchange traded fund that contains more than 10 different and diversified securities.
c) “profit gained” and “loss avoided” shall have the same definition as given 15 U.S. Code § 78u–1.
d) The term “security” shall have the same definition as given in 15 USC § 78c(a)(10).
e) The term “significant business dealing” shall be comprehensively defined and publicly released within one month of the first meeting of the Office of Congressional Trading, but not more than two months before the enactment of this Act, and shall include any dealing by an official in the public trust that:

i) Would significantly alter the liquidity of the official, or
ii) Would significantly alter the investment asset allocations (excluding securities) of the official.

SECTION V. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL TRADING
a) There is hereby established a joint Office of Congressional Trading for the House and Senate.
b) This office shall be an independent, non-partisan entity with the purpose as established in this Act to review actions by officials in the public trust and investigate, and if necessary refer, unlawful actions to the appropriate House or Senate Ethical committee or authority as designated in Section VIII.
c) The Office of Congressional Trading shall have 9 members.
d) Two seats shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House, two by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, two by the Majority Leader of the Senate, and two by Minority Leader of the Senate.

i) There shall be one Chair who is nominated jointly by the Speaker of the House and Senate Majority Leader.

e) All four leaders must agree to any appointments to the Office.
f) Any individual with exceptional public standing and qualifications based on their education, training, or experience in fields relevant to this Act shall be eligible to serve in the Office.

i) No registered lobbyist, nor someone who has been a lobbyist in the past five years, agent of foreign government, member of Congress, or employee of the federal government shall be eligible to serve in the Office.

g) There shall be a term limit of ten years for any member of the Office.
h) Any member of the Office may be removed for cause if all four aforementioned Congressional leaders agree.
i) The Office shall meet when called upon by the Chair.
j) All members of the board shall be compensated at rate equal to the minimum rate payable to GS–15 government employees each day (including travel time) during which the member is performing official duties of the Office.

i) The Office shall be authorized to hire not more than ten additional staffers to perform supporting duties of the Office, to be compensated at a rate equal to the minimum rate payable to GS-13 government employees each day (including travel time) during which the staffer is performing duties of the Office.

k) A majority of board members must be present for quorum to be established.
l) Any action or release authorized by the Office must have the approval of a majority of those present.
SECTION VI. REGULATIONS ON SECURITY TRADING AND CERTAIN BUSINESS DEALINGS
a) No official in public trust shall, directly or indirectly, trade or hold securities other than ETFs.

i) Should any official in the public trust hold such securities at the time this Act goes into effect, they shall have five years to liquidate, move to a blind trust, or otherwise remove such securities from their portfolio, however, any such transaction must be reported as stated in (c).
ii) Should an individual become an official in public trust and hold such securities at that time, they shall have one year to liquidate, move to a blind trust, or otherwise remove such securities from their portfolio, however, any such transaction must be reported as stated in (c).

b) No official in the public trust shall knowingly engage in substantial business dealings that would result in profit-gained or loss-avoided that were influenced by non-public information gained from the official being in the position they are in.
c) All potential significant business dealings and security trades by an official in the public trust must be transmitted to the Office of Congressional Trading, with the reason such an action is being taken, when the action will be taken, and what outcomes the action will have on the officials finances.
d) The Office of Congressional Trading shall have no more than thirty days to review the action transmitted by the official, and issue a statement to the official about whether such an action would likely be permitted under the regulations as established by this Act and any other relevant legislation.

i) Should the Office not release any such statement within 30 days, section (f) of this section shall not apply to this dealing.

e) The statement shall be solely released to the official immediately after the Office authorizes it, but record of the statement and initial transmission shall be publicly released one month following the Office authorizes the statement, or one month after the estimated timing of the action as stated in the initial transmission, whichever is later.

i) The statement and transmission shall be released at request at any time to the enforcement officers as authorized in Section VIII.

f) The official in the public trust shall not be bound to, nor restricted from, taking any action regardless of the recommendation of the Office of Congressional Trading, however, taking action which deviates from the recommendation of the board may be admissible as evidence to a United States District Court, or appropriate authority as stated in Section VIII, that the individual had knowledge the action they are taking and knowingly took it knowing they that action may not be authorized according to the provisions of this Act or a related Act. However, admission of this evidence alone shall not be used to determine any potential violation of this Act, and shall be supplementary in nature only.
SECTION VII. EXEMPTIONS
a) Should any official in the public trust be an officer or member of the board of directors of a public or private corporation, they shall be authorized to trade securities directly related to that corporation.
b) This section shall not be interpreted to exempt that official or their spouse from other sections of this Act, including reporting requirements.
c) This section shall not be interpreted to waive any other legislation or regulations regarding trading on insider knowledge.
SECTION VIII. ENFORCEMENT
a) The Securities and Exchange Commission, along with the Department of Justice, shall have the authority to investigate and enforce the provisions of this Act.
b) Additionally, whichever person who has been harmed by the person who has committed such violations as outlined in this Act, shall have standing to bring action in a United States District Court, and the court shall have the jurisdiction to impose a civil or criminal penalty against such person who has committed the violation, depending on the degree of the violation.
c) Any monetary penalty related to the enforcement of this Act shall not be less than two times the amount a court has determined was illicitly gained, or saved from loss.
d) Penalties beyond those to provide relief to victims for any claims they may have shall be payable to the Treasury of the United States.
SECTION IX. ENACTMENT
a) In any such instance where the provisions of this Act conflict with Public Law 112-105, or any other legislation, the provisions of this Act shall take precedence.
b) If any provision of this bill shall be found unconstitutional, unenforceable, or otherwise stricken, the remainder of the bill shall remain in full force and effect.
c) The provisions of this Act shall go into effect one year after passage.
This Act was authored and sponsored by Senator ItsBOOM (R-SR)

Strengthening Congressional Disclosures and Trading Regulations Act

Whereas one of the worst acts a public official can take is attempting to profit from the information provided to them through their duties as a public servant,
Whereas insider trading works against the goals of an efficient market,
Whereas more disclosures regarding congressional trading will make potential wrong-doing easier to spot,
Whereas public officials must be fully accountable to the people they represent,
Be it Enacted by the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION I. TITLE
a) This act shall be referred to as the “Strengthening Congressional Disclosures and Trading Regulations Act.”
SECTION II. FINDINGS
a) Congress finds that there are not adequate measures in place to prevent Congressmen and public officials engaging in trading with non-public knowledge.
b) Congress finds the STOCK Act attempted to make public officials more accountable, but did not go far enough.
c) Congress finds that there are other business transactions outside of stock trades that could be made based on non-public knowledge.
SECTION III. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
a) This bill is enacted pursuant to the power granted to Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.
SECTION IV. DEFINITIONS
a) “Official in public trust” shall be defined as any member or delegate to the United States Congress and their spouse, any member of Congressional staff, any officer or employee of the Legislative branch, any Executive branch employee as defined in under Section 2105 of Title 5, and any judicial employee or judicial officer as defined under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.
b) An “eligible exchange traded fund” (hereafter referred to as an “ETF”) shall be defined as any exchange traded fund that contains more than 10 different and diversified securities.
c) “profit gained” and “loss avoided” shall have the same definition as given 15 U.S. Code § 78u–1.
d) The term “security” shall have the same definition as given in 15 USC § 78c(a)(10).
e) The term “significant business dealing” shall be comprehensively defined and publicly released within one month of the first meeting of the Office of Congressional Trading, but not more than two months before the enactment of this Act, and shall include any dealing by an official in the public trust that:

i) Would significantly alter the liquidity of the official, or
ii) Would significantly alter the investment asset allocations (excluding securities) of the official.

SECTION V. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL TRADING
a) There is hereby established a joint Office of Congressional Trading for the House and Senate.
b) This office shall be an independent, non-partisan entity with the purpose as established in this Act to review actions by officials in the public trust and investigate, and if necessary refer, unlawful actions to the appropriate House or Senate Ethical committee or authority as designated in Section VIII.
c) The Office of Congressional Trading shall have 9 members.
d) Two seats shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House, two by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, two by the Majority Leader of the Senate, and two by Minority Leader of the Senate.

i) There shall be one Chair who is nominated jointly by the Speaker of the House and Senate Majority Leader.

e) All four leaders must agree to any appointments to the Office.
f) Any individual with exceptional public standing and qualifications based on their education, training, or experience in fields relevant to this Act shall be eligible to serve in the Office.

i) No registered lobbyist, nor someone who has been a lobbyist in the past five years, agent of foreign government, member of Congress, or employee of the federal government shall be eligible to serve in the Office.

g) There shall be a term limit of ten years for any member of the Office.
h) Any member of the Office may be removed for cause if all four aforementioned Congressional leaders agree.
i) The Office shall meet when called upon by the Chair.
j) All members of the board shall be compensated at rate equal to the minimum rate payable to GS–15 government employees each day (including travel time) during which the member is performing official duties of the Office.

i) The Office shall be authorized to hire not more than ten additional staffers to perform supporting duties of the Office, to be compensated at a rate equal to the minimum rate payable to GS-13 government employees each day (including travel time) during which the staffer is performing duties of the Office.

k) A majority of board members must be present for quorum to be established.
l) Any action or release authorized by the Office must have the approval of a majority of those present.
SECTION VI. REGULATIONS ON SECURITY TRADING AND CERTAIN BUSINESS DEALINGS
a) No official in public trust shall, directly or indirectly, trade or hold securities other than ETFs.

i) Should any official in the public trust hold such securities at the time this Act goes into effect, they shall have five years to liquidate, move to a blind trust, or otherwise remove such securities from their portfolio, however, any such transaction must be reported as stated in (c).
ii) Should an individual become an official in public trust and hold such securities at that time, they shall have one year to liquidate, move to a blind trust, or otherwise remove such securities from their portfolio, however, any such transaction must be reported as stated in (c).

b) No official in the public trust shall knowingly engage in substantial business dealings that would result in profit-gained or loss-avoided that were influenced by non-public information gained from the official being in the position they are in.
c) All potential significant business dealings and security trades by an official in the public trust must be transmitted to the Office of Congressional Trading, with the reason such an action is being taken, when the action will be taken, and what outcomes the action will have on the officials finances.
d) The Office of Congressional Trading shall have no more than thirty days to review the action transmitted by the official, and issue a statement to the official about whether such an action would likely be permitted under the regulations as established by this Act and any other relevant legislation.

i) Should the Office not release any such statement within 30 days, section (f) of this section shall not apply to this dealing.

e) The statement shall be solely released to the official immediately after the Office authorizes it, but record of the statement and initial transmission shall be publicly released one month following the Office authorizes the statement, or one month after the estimated timing of the action as stated in the initial transmission, whichever is later.

i) The statement and transmission shall be released at request at any time to the enforcement officers as authorized in Section VIII.

f) The official in the public trust shall not be bound to, nor restricted from, taking any action regardless of the recommendation of the Office of Congressional Trading, however, taking action which deviates from the recommendation of the board may be admissible as evidence to a United States District Court, or appropriate authority as stated in Section VIII, that the individual had knowledge the action they are taking and knowingly took it knowing they that action may not be authorized according to the provisions of this Act or a related Act. However, admission of this evidence alone shall not be used to determine any potential violation of this Act, and shall be supplementary in nature only.
SECTION VII. EXEMPTIONS
a) Should any official in the public trust be an officer or member of the board of directors of a public or private corporation, they shall be authorized to trade securities directly related to that corporation.
b) This section shall not be interpreted to exempt that official or their spouse from other sections of this Act, including reporting requirements.
c) This section shall not be interpreted to waive any other legislation or regulations regarding trading on insider knowledge.
SECTION VIII. ENFORCEMENT
a) The Securities and Exchange Commission, along with the Department of Justice, shall have the authority to investigate and enforce the provisions of this Act.
b) Additionally, whichever person who has been harmed by the person who has committed such violations as outlined in this Act, shall have standing to bring action in a United States District Court, and the court shall have the jurisdiction to impose a civil or criminal penalty against such person who has committed the violation, depending on the degree of the violation.
c) Any monetary penalty related to the enforcement of this Act shall not be less than two times the amount a court has determined was illicitly gained, or saved from loss.
d) Penalties beyond those to provide relief to victims for any claims they may have shall be payable to the Treasury of the United States.
SECTION IX. ENACTMENT
a) In any such instance where the provisions of this Act conflict with Public Law 112-105, or any other legislation, the provisions of this Act shall take precedence.
b) If any provision of this bill shall be found unconstitutional, unenforceable, or otherwise stricken, the remainder of the bill shall remain in full force and effect.
c) The provisions of this Act shall go into effect one year after passage.
This Act was authored and sponsored by Senator ItsBOOM (R-SR)

Strengthening Congressional Disclosures and Trading Regulations Act

Whereas one of the worst acts a public official can take is attempting to profit from the information provided to them through their duties as a public servant,
Whereas insider trading works against the goals of an efficient market,
Whereas more disclosures regarding congressional trading will make potential wrong-doing easier to spot,
Whereas public officials must be fully accountable to the people they represent,
Be it Enacted by the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION I. TITLE
a) This act shall be referred to as the “Strengthening Congressional Disclosures and Trading Regulations Act.”
SECTION II. FINDINGS
a) Congress finds that there are not adequate measures in place to prevent Congressmen and public officials engaging in trading with non-public knowledge.
b) Congress finds the STOCK Act attempted to make public officials more accountable, but did not go far enough.
c) Congress finds that there are other business transactions outside of stock trades that could be made based on non-public knowledge.
SECTION III. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
a) This bill is enacted pursuant to the power granted to Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.
SECTION IV. DEFINITIONS
a) “Official in public trust” shall be defined as any member or delegate to the United States Congress and their spouse, any member of Congressional staff, any officer or employee of the Legislative branch, any Executive branch employee as defined in under Section 2105 of Title 5, and any judicial employee or judicial officer as defined under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.
b) An “eligible exchange traded fund” (hereafter referred to as an “ETF”) shall be defined as any exchange traded fund that contains more than 10 different and diversified securities.
c) “profit gained” and “loss avoided” shall have the same definition as given 15 U.S. Code § 78u–1.
d) The term “security” shall have the same definition as given in 15 USC § 78c(a)(10).
e) The term “significant business dealing” shall be comprehensively defined and publicly released within one month of the first meeting of the Office of Congressional Trading, but not more than two months before the enactment of this Act, and shall include any dealing by an official in the public trust that:

i) Would significantly alter the liquidity of the official, or
ii) Would significantly alter the investment asset allocations (excluding securities) of the official.

SECTION V. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL TRADING
a) There is hereby established a joint Office of Congressional Trading for the House and Senate.
b) This office shall be an independent, non-partisan entity with the purpose as established in this Act to review actions by officials in the public trust and investigate, and if necessary refer, unlawful actions to the appropriate House or Senate Ethical committee or authority as designated in Section VIII.
c) The Office of Congressional Trading shall have 9 members.
d) Two seats shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House, two by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, two by the Majority Leader of the Senate, and two by Minority Leader of the Senate.

i) There shall be one Chair who is nominated jointly by the Speaker of the House and Senate Majority Leader.

e) All four leaders must agree to any appointments to the Office.
f) Any individual with exceptional public standing and qualifications based on their education, training, or experience in fields relevant to this Act shall be eligible to serve in the Office.

i) No registered lobbyist, nor someone who has been a lobbyist in the past five years, agent of foreign government, member of Congress, or employee of the federal government shall be eligible to serve in the Office.

g) There shall be a term limit of ten years for any member of the Office.
h) Any member of the Office may be removed for cause if all four aforementioned Congressional leaders agree.
i) The Office shall meet when called upon by the Chair.
j) All members of the board shall be compensated at rate equal to the minimum rate payable to GS–15 government employees each day (including travel time) during which the member is performing official duties of the Office.

i) The Office shall be authorized to hire not more than ten additional staffers to perform supporting duties of the Office, to be compensated at a rate equal to the minimum rate payable to GS-13 government employees each day (including travel time) during which the staffer is performing duties of the Office.

k) A majority of board members must be present for quorum to be established.
l) Any action or release authorized by the Office must have the approval of a majority of those present.
SECTION VI. REGULATIONS ON SECURITY TRADING AND CERTAIN BUSINESS DEALINGS
a) No official in public trust shall, directly or indirectly, trade or hold securities other than ETFs.

i) Should any official in the public trust hold such securities at the time this Act goes into effect, they shall have five years to liquidate, move to a blind trust, or otherwise remove such securities from their portfolio, however, any such transaction must be reported as stated in (c).
ii) Should an individual become an official in public trust and hold such securities at that time, they shall have one year to liquidate, move to a blind trust, or otherwise remove such securities from their portfolio, however, any such transaction must be reported as stated in (c).

b) No official in the public trust shall knowingly engage in substantial business dealings that would result in profit-gained or loss-avoided that were influenced by non-public information gained from the official being in the position they are in. No official in the public trust, or a representative thereof, shall knowingly engage in substantial business dealings that would result in profit-gained or loss-avoided that were influenced by non-public information gained from the official being in the position they are in.
c) All potential significant business dealings and security trades by an official in the public trust must be transmitted to the Office of Congressional Trading, with the reason such an action is being taken, when the action will be taken, and what outcomes the action will have on the officials finances.
d) The Office of Congressional Trading shall have no more than thirty days to review the action transmitted by the official, and issue a statement to the official about whether such an action would likely be permitted under the regulations as established by this Act and any other relevant legislation.

i) Should the Office not release any such statement within 30 days, section (f) of this section shall not apply to this dealing.

e) The statement shall be solely released to the official immediately after the Office authorizes it, but record of the statement and initial transmission shall be publicly released one month following the Office authorizes the statement, or one month after the estimated timing of the action as stated in the initial transmission, whichever is later.

i) The statement and transmission shall be released at request at any time to the enforcement officers as authorized in Section VIII.

f) The official in the public trust shall not be bound to, nor restricted from, taking any action regardless of the recommendation of the Office of Congressional Trading, however, taking action which deviates from the recommendation of the board may be admissible as evidence to a United States District Court, or appropriate authority as stated in Section VIII, that the individual had knowledge the action they are taking and knowingly took it knowing they that action may not be authorized according to the provisions of this Act or a related Act. However, admission of this evidence alone shall not be used to determine any potential violation of this Act, and shall be supplementary in nature only. The official in the public trust shall not be bound to, nor restricted from, taking any action regardless of the recommendation of the Office of Congressional Trading, however, taking action which deviates from the recommendation of the board, or taking the action before the Office issues a recommendation but before 30 days, may be admissible as evidence to an ~~United States District Court, or~~ appropriate authority as stated in Section VIII, that the individual, ~~had knowledge the action they are taking and knowingly took it knowing they that action may not be authorized according~~ knowingly took the action in possible violation of Section VI (b), the provisions of this Act, or a related Act. ~~However, admission of this evidence alone shall not be used to determine any potential violation of this Act, and shall be supplementary in nature only.~~
SECTION VII. EXEMPTIONS
a) Should any official in the public trust be an officer or member of the board of directors of a public or private corporation, they shall be authorized to trade securities directly related to that corporation.
b) This section shall not be interpreted to exempt that official or their spouse from other sections of this Act, including reporting requirements.
c) This section shall not be interpreted to waive any other legislation or regulations regarding trading on insider knowledge.
SECTION VIII. ENFORCEMENT
a) The Securities and Exchange Commission, along with the Department of Justice, shall have the authority to investigate and enforce the provisions of this Act.
b) Additionally, whichever person who has been harmed by the person who has committed such violations as outlined in this Act, shall have standing to bring action in a United States District Court, and the court shall have the jurisdiction to impose a civil or criminal penalty against such person who has committed the violation, depending on the degree of the violation.
c) Any monetary penalty related to the enforcement of this Act shall not be less than two times the amount a court has determined was illicitly gained, or saved from loss.
d) Penalties beyond those to provide relief to victims for any claims they may have shall be payable to the Treasury of the United States.
SECTION IX. ENACTMENT
a) In any such instance where the provisions of this Act conflict with Public Law 112-105, or any other legislation, the provisions of this Act shall take precedence.
b) If any provision of this bill shall be found unconstitutional, unenforceable, or otherwise stricken, the remainder of the bill shall remain in full force and effect.
c) The provisions of this Act shall go into effect one year after passage.
This Act was authored and sponsored by Senator ItsBOOM (R-SR)

Strengthening Congressional Disclosures and Trading Regulations Act

Whereas one of the worst acts a public official can take is attempting to profit from the information provided to them through their duties as a public servant,
Whereas insider trading works against the goals of an efficient market,
Whereas more disclosures regarding congressional trading will make potential wrong-doing easier to spot,
Whereas public officials must be fully accountable to the people they represent,
Be it Enacted by the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION I. TITLE
a) This act shall be referred to as the “Strengthening Congressional Disclosures and Trading Regulations Act.”
SECTION II. FINDINGS
a) Congress finds that there are not adequate measures in place to prevent Congressmen and public officials engaging in trading with non-public knowledge.
b) Congress finds the STOCK Act attempted to make public officials more accountable, but did not go far enough.
c) Congress finds that there are other business transactions outside of stock trades that could be made based on non-public knowledge.
SECTION III. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
a) This bill is enacted pursuant to the power granted to Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.
SECTION IV. DEFINITIONS
a) “Official in public trust” shall be defined as any member or delegate to the United States Congress and their spouse, any member of Congressional staff, any officer or employee of the Legislative branch, any Executive branch employee as defined in under Section 2105 of Title 5, and any judicial employee or judicial officer as defined under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.
b) An “eligible exchange traded fund” (hereafter referred to as an “ETF”) shall be defined as any exchange traded fund that contains more than 10 different and diversified securities.
c) “profit gained” and “loss avoided” shall have the same definition as given 15 U.S. Code § 78u–1.
d) The term “security” shall have the same definition as given in 15 USC § 78c(a)(10).
e) The term “significant business dealing” shall be comprehensively defined and publicly released within one month of the first meeting of the Office of Congressional Trading, but not more than two months before the enactment of this Act, and shall include any dealing by an official in the public trust that:

i) Would significantly alter the liquidity of the official, or
ii) Would significantly alter the investment asset allocations (excluding securities) of the official.

SECTION V. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL TRADING
a) There is hereby established a joint Office of Congressional Trading for the House and Senate.
b) This office shall be an independent, non-partisan entity with the purpose as established in this Act to review actions by officials in the public trust and investigate, and if necessary refer, unlawful actions to the appropriate House or Senate Ethical committee or authority as designated in Section VIII.
c) The Office of Congressional Trading shall have 9 members.
d) Two seats shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House, two by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, two by the Majority Leader of the Senate, and two by Minority Leader of the Senate.

i) There shall be one Chair who is nominated jointly by the Speaker of the House and Senate Majority Leader.

e) All four leaders must agree to any appointments to the Office.
f) Any individual with exceptional public standing and qualifications based on their education, training, or experience in fields relevant to this Act shall be eligible to serve in the Office.

i) No registered lobbyist, nor someone who has been a lobbyist in the past five years, agent of foreign government, member of Congress, or employee of the federal government shall be eligible to serve in the Office.

g) There shall be a term limit of ten years for any member of the Office.
h) Any member of the Office may be removed for cause if all four aforementioned Congressional leaders agree.
i) The Office shall meet when called upon by the Chair.
j) All members of the board shall be compensated at rate equal to the minimum rate payable to GS–15 government employees each day (including travel time) during which the member is performing official duties of the Office.

i) The Office shall be authorized to hire not more than ten additional staffers to perform supporting duties of the Office, to be compensated at a rate equal to the minimum rate payable to GS-13 government employees each day (including travel time) during which the staffer is performing duties of the Office.

k) A majority of board members must be present for quorum to be established.
l) Any action or release authorized by the Office must have the approval of a majority of those present.
SECTION VI. REGULATIONS ON SECURITY TRADING AND CERTAIN BUSINESS DEALINGS
a) No official in public trust shall, directly or indirectly, trade or hold securities other than ETFs.

i) Should any official in the public trust hold such securities at the time this Act goes into effect, they shall have five years to liquidate, move to a blind trust, or otherwise remove such securities from their portfolio, however, any such transaction must be reported as stated in (c).
ii) Should an individual become an official in public trust and hold such securities at that time, they shall have one year to liquidate, move to a blind trust, or otherwise remove such securities from their portfolio, however, any such transaction must be reported as stated in (c).

b) No official in the public trust shall knowingly engage in substantial business dealings that would result in profit-gained or loss-avoided that were influenced by non-public information gained from the official being in the position they are in.
c) All potential significant business dealings and security trades by an official in the public trust must be transmitted to the Office of Congressional Trading, with the reason such an action is being taken, when the action will be taken, and what outcomes the action will have on the officials finances.
d) The Office of Congressional Trading shall have no more than thirty days to review the action transmitted by the official, and issue a statement to the official about whether such an action would likely be permitted under the regulations as established by this Act and any other relevant legislation.

i) Should the Office not release any such statement within 30 days, section (f) of this section shall not apply to this dealing.

e) The statement shall be solely released to the official immediately after the Office authorizes it, but record of the statement and initial transmission shall be publicly released one month following the Office authorizes the statement, or one month after the estimated timing of the action as stated in the initial transmission, whichever is later.

i) The statement and transmission shall be released at request at any time to the enforcement officers as authorized in Section VIII.

f) The official in the public trust shall not be bound to, nor restricted from, taking any action regardless of the recommendation of the Office of Congressional Trading, however, taking action which deviates from the recommendation of the board may be admissible as evidence to a United States District Court, or appropriate authority as stated in Section VIII, that the individual had knowledge the action they are taking and knowingly took it knowing they that action may not be authorized according to the provisions of this Act or a related Act. However, admission of this evidence alone shall not be used to determine any potential violation of this Act, and shall be supplementary in nature only.
SECTION VII. EXEMPTIONS
a) Should any official in the public trust be an officer or member of the board of directors of a public or private corporation, they shall be authorized to trade securities directly related to that corporation.
b) This section shall not be interpreted to exempt that official or their spouse from other sections of this Act, including reporting requirements.
c) This section shall not be interpreted to waive any other legislation or regulations regarding trading on insider knowledge.
SECTION VIII. ENFORCEMENT
a) The Securities and Exchange Commission, along with the Department of Justice, shall have the authority to investigate and enforce the provisions of this Act.
b) Additionally, whichever person who has been harmed by the person who has committed such violations as outlined in this Act, shall have standing to bring action in a United States District Court, and the court shall have the jurisdiction to impose a civil or criminal penalty against such person who has committed the violation, depending on the degree of the violation.
c) Any monetary penalty related to the enforcement of this Act shall not be less than two times the amount a court has determined was illicitly gained, or saved from loss.
d) Penalties beyond those to provide relief to victims for any claims they may have shall be payable to the Treasury of the United States.
SECTION IX. ENACTMENT
a) In any such instance where the provisions of this Act conflict with Public Law 112-105, or any other legislation, the provisions of this Act shall take precedence.
b) If any provision of this bill shall be found unconstitutional, unenforceable, or otherwise stricken, the remainder of the bill shall remain in full force and effect.
c) The provisions of this Act shall go into effect one year after passage.
This Act was authored and sponsored by Senator ItsBOOM (R-SR)

5 months ago u/mormondocuments promised a big leak of Mormon Church administrative documents.
https://www.reddit.com/exmormon/comments/4fzc73/who_wants_to_see_some_secret_mormon_church/
He then made a few teasers:
https://www.reddit.com/exmormon/comments/4fzgra/lds_church_global_government_relations_policies/
https://www.reddit.com/exmormon/comments/4px7fb/too_bad_joseph_didnt_have_one_of_these_would_have/
The actual leaks started only a few hours ago:
Leaked Document #1: Temple Purchasing Guide
Leaked Document #2: Church Cash Financial Standard Policy Paper
Leaked Document #3: Purchasing Guide for Mission Homes, Visitor Center Director Homes, and Church-owned Mission Housing
Leaked Document #4: Want a Missionary Badge? PROCEDURES: Ordering Missionary Badges
Leaked Document #5 | Financial Standards: Investments
Leaked Document #6 | Financial Standards: Capital Assets
Leaked Document #7 | Intellectual Property Policies
Leaked Document #8 | Area Legal Counsel Map
Leaked Document #9 | Sensitive Units: Church Directory of Organizations and Leaders
Leaked Document #10: Church Security Department Executive Committee
Leaked Document #11: Ecclesiastical Departments Policies
Leaked Document #12: Church Security Global Security Operations Center (GSOC) Synopsis
Leaked Document #13: Distribution Services Restricted Items List
Leaked Document #14: Employee Discipline: A Guide for Church Employment
Leaked Document #15: Global Government Relations Policies and Procedures Memo
Leaked Document #16: Church Records (Administrative/Financial/Legal) Retention Information
Leaked Document #17: Portfolio Financial Report
Leaked Document #18: Portfolio Project Budget Summary
Leaked Document #19: Public Affairs Training Manual
Leaked Document #20: INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS - MISSION OFFICE INTERNAL CONTROL EVALUATION (ICE) INSTRUCTIONS
Leaked Document #21: Website Metrics
Leaked Document #22: Tech Use Among Members
Leaked Document #23: Financial Plan for "Mormon Messages" Program
Leaked Document #24: Budget/Concept Approval for Temple Groundbreakings, Open Houses, Cultural Events, and Dedications
Leaked Document #25: Accessing and Securing Financial Information
Leaked Document #26: Meetinghouse Blueprints
Leaked Document #27: Church Directory of Organizations and Leaders Training Manual
Leaked Document #28: Church Unit Banking Services User Guide
Leaked Document #29: First Presidency Disciplinary Council Data Usage Agreement
Leaked Document #30: Bullshit J.R. Holland Internal Employee Talk on Leadership
Leaked Document #31: Social Media Campaign Concept and Budget
Leaked Document #32: Quorum of the 12 Budget for Special Events: $1,500,000.00
Leaked Document #33: "Overcoming Pornography" Product, Concept, and Budget
Leaked Document #34: Ambassador Outreach Initiative
Leaked Document #35: Policy on Meetings, Contacts, or Requests with High-Level Gov. Officials
Leaked Document #36: Europe Area Plan Executive Version
Leaked Document #37: Church Travel Handbook
Leaked Document #38: Church Security Department World Risk
Leaked Document #39: Church Security Department Document on Global Scams
Leaked Document #40: Church Security Dept Handout on Questioning and Interrogation
Leaked Document #41: Clothing Reference Guide
Leaked Document #42: Philippines Government Relation Plan
Leaked Document #43: Worldwide Government Relations Priority Countries
Leaked Document #44: Solomon Islands Real Estate Briefing Paper
Leaked Document #45: "Budget Status Report for Closing Project Review"
Leaked Document #46: Presiding Bishopric Safety and Health Information Manual
Leaked Document #47: Church Global Service Center Costs
Leaked Document #48: Global Human Resources Policy Manual
Leaked Document #49: Global Government Relations Policies and Procedures
Leaked Document #50: Scripture Product Plan ($19,500,000 for five years)
Leaked Document #51: Financial Standard: Payment Cards
Leaked Document #52: Communication Services Committee Memo w/ Budget
Leaked Document #53: April 2015 Mission President Seminar Itinerary at EDSA ShangriLa Hotel
Leaked Document #54: 2008 Missionary Tech Plan w/ Financial Projections
Leaked Document #55: First Presidency Memo Re: European Government Relations
Leaked Document #56: Major IT Incident Management Guidelines
Leaked Document #57: United Nations Memo
Leaked Document #58: Guidelines for UN Government Relations Couple in Geneva
Leaked Document #59: General Authority Tech Plan and Budget
Leaked Document #60: Internal RID market survey of Church History and its impact on testimony of members, etc.
Leaked Document #61: Negotiating Contracts on Behalf of the Church
Leaked Document #62: Europe Area Germany Employee Guide
Leaked Document #63: Church Security Investigator Job Description
Leaked Document #64: Job Description/Annual Pay for Confidential Records Section Mgrs: $445,000.00
He also made a personal post about the leaks:
https://www.reddit.com/exmormon/comments/53yzmh/and_now_for_a_personal_post/
If any links are broken or link to the wrong post please let us know. This post will be updated periodically to include more documents as the whistleblower releases more.

Note: Some of these documents do include personal information, but reddit's admins have said that they are okay with PI if its on a 3rd party site and newsworthy (this is definitely newsworthy).
Note: Many of these links are to /exmormon, please don't overwhelm a smaller subreddit with activity; their mods are already busy.

All of the documents can also be found on /Mormonleaks
UPDATE: The mormons have verified the authenticity of the leaked documents when LDS church spokesman Eric Hawkins called it a collection of “procedural manuals, work plans and memos with very little important or sensitive information,” in an email to Mashable.
The whistle blower says that more leaks are still coming during the fall conference October 1-2, so we'll leave this up a bit longer and see.

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